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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 3. Distinctions 1 - 17.
Book 3. Distinctions 1 - 17
Fourteenth Distinction
Question One. Whether it was possible for the Intellect of Christ’s Soul to be first and immediately Perfected by the Most Perfect Vision of the Word possible for a Creature

Question One. Whether it was possible for the Intellect of Christ’s Soul to be first and immediately Perfected by the Most Perfect Vision of the Word possible for a Creature

1. About the fourteenth distinction I aska whether it was possible for the intellect of Christ’s soul to be first at once and directly perfected by the most perfect vision of the Word possible for a creature.

a.a [Interpolation] About the fourteenth distinction, where the Master treats of the perfections [Christ] assumed with human nature in contrast to the perfection of the divine nature, four questions are asked: first whether it was possible for the intellect of Christ’s soul to be first at once and directly perfected by the most perfect vision of the Word possible for a creature; second, whether it was possible for the intellect of Christ’s soul to see in the Word everything that the Word himself sees; third, whether Christ’s soul knew everything in its proper genus; fourth whether Christ’s soul knew everything in its proper genus most perfectly. Argument about the first.

2. That it was not:

Augustine 83 Questions q.32 says, “It is not to be doubted that no one can understand the same thing more than another can.” His reason for this is that “anyone who understands a thing other than the thing is errs, - and everyone who errs does not understand that about which he errs; therefore, anyone who understands a thing other than it is does not understand it. Nothing then can be understood if it is not understood as it is.” From this the conclusion above stated follows. Therefore, the intellect of Christ’s soul cannot see the Word more perfectly than any other soul can.

3. Further, if it could most perfectly see the Word, then it could see the Word under the idea of infinity, because for everything visible not taken under the idea of infinity there is something more perfect that can be seen. The consequent is false, because ‘the object specifies the act’ (cf. Aristotle On the Soul 2.4.415a18-21), and so a created vision of the object would be of it under the idea of infinity and an uncreated vision of the object is of it according to the same idea; therefore the two visions would belong to the same species; and then similarly the intellect of Christ’s soul would comprehend the Word, for it would see the Word according to the whole idea of the Word’s visibility - which is unacceptable.

4. Further every vision requires a light proportional to it naturally prior to the vision itself; therefore, just as natural vision requires a natural light other than vision and prior to it, so supernatural vision requires a supernatural light other than vision and prior to it - and thus supernatural vision cannot be the first perfection of the one who is seeing.

5. Further, a perfect natural act is elicited by a habit, because it is not as perfect when it precedes the habit as when it follows it, according to the Philosopher in Ethics 2.1.1103a26-b22;     therefore , the most perfect supernatural act also presupposes the supernatural habit (the consequence is proved by way of similarity); and thus the most perfect supernatural act cannot be the first perfection of the intellect.

6. To the contrary is the Master in the text.

7. Besides, the highest enjoyment presupposes the highest vision; Christ’s soul was able to enjoy the highest enjoyment possible for a creature (from d.13 nn.80-81); therefore etc     .

8. And that it could have been immediately perfected by the vision of the Word is proved by the fact that any passive power can be immediately perfected by the act to which it is in immediate potency; therefore the intellect or the intellective power can be perfected immediately by the act of understanding, and thus without any necessary intermediary.